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Abstract
For several classes of reinforcement learning schemes, convergence to action proﬁles that are
not Nash equilibria may occur with positive probability under certain conditions on the payoﬀ
function. In this paper, we explore how an alternative reinforcement learning scheme, where the
strategy of each agent is also perturbed by a strategy-dependent perturbation (or mutations)
function, may exclude convergence to non-Nash pure strategy proﬁles. This approach extends
prior analysis on reinforcement learning in games that addresses the issue of convergence to
saddle boundary points. It further provides a framework under which the eﬀect of mutations can
be analyzed in the context of reinforcement learning.
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1 Introduction
Agent-based modeling has generated signiﬁcant interest in various settings, such as engineering,
social sciences and economics. In those formulations, agents make decisions independently and
without knowledge of the actions or intentions of the other agents. Usually, the interactions among
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1agents can be described in terms of a strategic-form game, and solution concepts, such as the Nash
equilibrium, can be utilized to describe desirable outcomes for all agents.
In this paper, we are interested in deriving conditions under which agents learn to play Nash
equilibria. Assuming minimum information available to each agent, namely its own utility and
actions, we introduce a novel reinforcement learning scheme and derive conditions under which
global convergence to Nash equilibria can be achieved.
In reinforcement learning schemes, agents build their conﬁdence over an action through repeated
selection of this action and proportionally to the reward received from this action (a behavior that also
resembles human-like rationality [1]). According to such a scheme, each agent updates a probability
distribution over its available actions and the probability of selecting an action increases whenever
this action is selected, proportionally to the reward received. This class of dynamics has been applied
in evolutionary economics, for modeling human and economic behavior [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], and sociology,
for modeling social network formation [6, 7].
Reinforcement learning schemes are also related to replicator dynamics [8] as has been pointed out
by several authors [2, 4, 5]. For example, in [2, 9], the asymmetric, continuous replicator dynamics
(cf., [10]) have been identiﬁed as the continuous time limit of a reinforcement learning scheme which
is based on Bush-Mosteller’s [11] simple learning model.
One of the main concerns in the analysis of reinforcement learning schemes is the derivation of
conditions under which convergence to Nash equilibria is established. However, for several reinforce-
ment learning schemes such as the model of [1] for human-like behavior, convergence to non-Nash
pure-strategy proﬁles may not be excluded [12]. Thus, the behavior of several reinforcement learning
models, e.g., the model by [1], cannot be directly related to (standard) replicator dynamics. This
is because non-Nash pure strategy proﬁles correspond to saddle boundary points of the replicator
dynamics.
Furthermore, and as pointed out in [4], analyzing the behavior of reinforcement learning in
the vicinity of boundary points of the domain may not be trivial, since standard results of the
ODE method for stochastic approximations (e.g., nonconvergence to unstable equilibria [13]) are not
applicable. In [12] conditions are established with respect to the payoﬀ function of the agents under
which nonconvergence to saddle boundary points is established for the reinforcement model of [1].
However. conditions under which such nonconvergence guarantees are established independently of
the payoﬀ function are still needed.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of reinforcement learning schemes where the strategies
of each agent are perturbed by a strategy- or state-dependent perturbation function. Contrary to
prior work on equilibrium selection where perturbation functions are also state dependent [14], the
perturbation function here is assumed to be local, i.e., it only depends on the strategy of each player.
2In particular, according to the proposed scheme, an agent experiments more when its strategy is closer
to a pure-strategy proﬁle, i.e., when it is quite certain about which action to play. It is shown that
such perturbation functions provide a justiﬁcation for non-convergence to non-Nash pure-strategy
proﬁles. More formally, due to the introduction of this class of perturbation functions, boundary
points of the domain that correspond to non-Nash pure-strategy proﬁles cease to be possible attractors
of the learning dynamics.
This paper extends prior work [15] of the authors, where the perturbation function was assumed
constant, independent of the strategy. In particular, we provide conditions under which the strategies
will converge to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria almost surely.
We further specialize the results to a class of games which belongs to the family of potential games
[16]. It includes common-payoﬀ (or identical-interest) games, congestion games [17], and two-player
rescaled partnership games [10]. Potential games are also of particular interest in engineering [18], for
example in congestion control [17], distributed spatial coverage [19] and distributed routing [20]. In
these examples, and when agents are playing the game repeatedly, learning to play a Nash equilibrium
is of special interest, especially when the information available to each agent is only the history of
its own utilities and its own actions. We provide conditions under which the proposed reinforcement
learning scheme converges to the set of pure Nash equilibria for this class of games. This result is also
an extension of prior work on reinforcement learning [5, 4] in potential games which has primarily
focused on the urn process of [3].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary termi-
nology. Section 3 discusses a standard reinforcement learning scheme and its behavior with respect
to convergence to non-Nash pure-strategy proﬁles. Section 4 introduces a perturbed reinforcement
learning scheme with a strategy-dependent perturbation function which intends on justifying non-
convergence to non-Nash pure-strategy proﬁles. The remainder of the paper addresses the conver-
gence properties of perturbed reinforcement learning. In particular, Section 5 states some standard
results from Lyapunov-based techniques and the ODE method for analyzing stochastic approxima-
tions. Sections 6 characterizes the set of stationary points of the reinforcement learning scheme
for the perturbed dynamics, while Section 7 analyzes the convergence properties of the perturbed
learning scheme. Finally, Section 8 specializes the results to a class of games which belongs to the
family of potential games, and Section 9 presents concluding remarks.
Notation:
− |x| denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x ∈ Rn.
− |x|∞ denotes the ℓ∞-norm of a vector x ∈ Rn.
3− Bδ(x) denotes the δ-neighborhood of vector x ∈ Rn, i.e.,
Bδ(x) , {y ∈ Rn : |x − y| < δ}.
− dist(x,A) from a point x to a set A is deﬁned as
dist(x,A) , inf
y∈A
|x − y|.
− Bδ(A) denotes the δ-neighborhood of set A ⊂ Rn, i.e.,
Bδ(A) , {x ∈ Rn : dist(x,A) < δ}.
− ∆(m) denotes the probability simplex of dimension m, i.e.,
∆(m) ,
 
x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0,1Tx = 1
 
,
where 1 is the vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
− Π∆ : Rm → ∆(m) is the projection to the probability simplex, i.e.,
Π∆[x] , arg min
y∈∆(m)
|x − y|.
− Ao is the interior of a subset A of Rn, and ∂A is its boundary.
− row{αi}i∈J denotes the block row vector with entries {αi}i∈J for some set of indices J, i.e.,
row{αi}i∈J , ( α1 ··· α|J| ),
where αi ∈ R1×ni for some ni ∈ N, i ∈ J. Likewise, col{·} will denote a block column vector.
− diag{Ai}i∈J denotes the block diagonal matrix with diagonal entries {Ai}i∈J for some set of
indices J, i.e.,
diag{Ai}i∈J ,


A1
...
A|J|

,
where Ai ∈ Rni×mi for some ni,mi ∈ N, i ∈ J.
42 Terminology
We consider the standard setup of ﬁnite strategic-form games.
2.1 Game
A ﬁnite strategic-form game involves a ﬁnite set of agents (or players), I , {1,2,...,n}. Each agent
i ∈ I has a ﬁnite set of available choices (or actions), Ai. Let αi ∈ Ai denote an action of agent i,
and α = (α1,α2,...,αn) the action proﬁle of all agents. The set A is the Cartesian product of the
action spaces of all agents, i.e., A , A1 × ... × An.
The action proﬁle α ∈ A produces a payoﬀ (or utility) for each agent. The utility of agent i,
denoted by Ri, is a function which maps the action proﬁle α to a payoﬀ in R. It constitutes a measure
of the desirability of the action proﬁle α, where a high-payoﬀ action proﬁle is more desirable than a
low-payoﬀ action proﬁle. Also denote by R : A → Rn the combination of payoﬀs (or payoﬀ proﬁle)
of all agents, i.e., R(·) , (R1(·),R2(·),...,Rn(·)). A strategic-form game will then be completely
characterized by the triple {I,A,R}.
2.2 Strategy
Since each agent selects actions independently, we generally assume that each agent’s action is a
realization of an independent discrete random variable. Let σij ∈ [0,1] denote the probability that
agent i selects action αi = j ∈ Ai. If
 
j∈Ai σij = 1, then σi , (σi1,σi2,...,σi|Ai|) is a probability
distribution over the set of actions Ai (or strategy of agent i), where |Ai| denote the cardinality of
the set Ai. Then σi ∈ ∆(|Ai|). We will also use the term strategy proﬁle to denote the combination
of strategies of all agents σ = (σ1,σ2,...,σn) ∈ ∆ where ∆ , ∆(|A1|) × ... × ∆(|An|) is the set of
strategy proﬁles.
Note that if σi is a unit vector (or a vertex of ∆(|Ai|)), say ej, then agent i selects an action j
with probability one. Such a strategy will be called pure strategy. Likewise, a pure strategy proﬁle
is a proﬁle of pure strategies. We will also use the term mixed strategy to denote a strategy that is
not pure.
2.3 Expected payoﬀ and Nash equilibrium
Given a strategy proﬁle σ ∈ ∆, the expected payoﬀ vector of each agent i, Ui : ∆ → R|Ai|, can be
computed by
Ui(σ) ,
 
j∈Ai
ej
 
α−i∈A−i
 
 
s∈−i
σsαs
 
Ri(j,α−i). (1)
5We may think of the entry j of the expected payoﬀ vector, denoted Uij(σ), as the payoﬀ of agent i
who is playing action j at strategy proﬁle σ. We denote the proﬁle of expected payoﬀs by U(σ) =
(U1(σ),...,Un(σ)). Finally, let ui(σ) be the expected payoﬀ of agent i at strategy proﬁle σ ∈ ∆,
deﬁned as follows:
ui(σ) , σT
i Ui(σ).
In the trivial case of n = 2, it is straightforward to check that for every i ∈ I, there exists a
matrix Di ∈ R|Ai|×|A−i|, such that Di = [Ri(j,ℓ)]jℓ.1 In this case, the expected payoﬀ of player i can
be written in the simpliﬁed form:
ui(σ) = σT
i Diσ−i.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Nash equilibrium) A strategy proﬁle σ∗ = (σ∗
1,σ∗
2,...,σ∗
n) ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilib-
rium if, for each agent i ∈ I,
ui(σ∗
i ,σ∗
−i) ≥ ui(σi,σ∗
−i) (2)
for all σi ∈ ∆(|Ai|) and σi  = σ∗
i, where σ∗
−i denote the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of all agents but i.
In the special case where for all i ∈ I, σ∗
i is a pure strategy, then the Nash equilibrium is called
pure Nash equilibrium. Also, in case the inequality in (2) is strict, the Nash equilibrium will be called
a strict Nash equilibrium.
3 Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we introduce the basic form of reinforcement learning that we will consider in the
remainder of the paper. It belongs to the general class of learning automata [21].
The basic idea behind a reinforcement learning scheme is simple. If agent i selects action j at
instant k and a favorable payoﬀ results, Ri(α(k)), the action probability σij(k) is increased and all
the other components of σi(k) are decreased. For an unfavorable payoﬀ, σij(k) is decreased and all
the other components of σi(k) are increased.
The precise manner in which σi(k) is changed depending on the action αi performed at stage k
and the response Ri(α(k)) of the environment completely deﬁnes the reinforcement scheme. This
speciﬁcation, in turn, determines the resulting Markov process and hence the behavior of the overall
system.
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume:
Assumption 1 (Strictly positive rewards) For every i ∈ I, the reward function satisﬁes Ri(α) >
0 for all α ∈ A.
1The notation −i denotes the complementary set I\{i}. We will often split the argument of a function in this way,
e.g., F(α) = F(αi,α−i) or F(x) = F(xi,x−i).
63.1 Reinforcement Learning Scheme (   LR−I)
We consider a reinforcement scheme that is a small modiﬁcation of the original linear reward-inaction
scheme (LR−I) introduced by [22, 23]. This modiﬁed scheme, denoted by   LR−I, was introduced in
[15]. Compared with LR−I, the reward in   LR−I may take values other than {0,1}, which increases
the family of games that this learning scheme can be applied to.
According to   LR−I, the probability that agent i selects action j at time k is
σij(k) = xij(k)
for some probability vector xi(k) which is updated according to the recursion:
xi(k + 1) = Π∆
 
xi(k) + ǫ(k) · Ri(α(k)) · [eαi(k) − xi(k)]
 
. (3)
Here we identify actions Ai with vertices of the simplex, {e1,...,e|Ai|}. For example, if agent i
selects action j at time k, then eαi(k) = ej. Note that by letting the step-size sequence ǫ(k) to be
suﬃciently small and since the payoﬀ function Ri(·) is uniformly bounded in A, xi(k) ∈ ∆(|Ai|) and
the projection operator can be omitted.
We consider the following class of step-size sequences:
ǫ(k) =
1
kν + 1
(4)
for some ν ∈ (1/2,1]. For these values of ν, the following two conditions can easily be veriﬁed:
∞  
k=0
ǫ(k) = ∞ and
∞  
k=0
ǫ(k)2 < ∞. (5)
The selection of ν is closely related to the desired rate of convergence.
Compared with prior reinforcement schemes, in particular the models of [1, 4], the main diﬀerence
lies in the step-size sequence. More speciﬁcally, in [1] the step-size sequence of agent i is ǫi(k) =
1/(ckν +Ri(α)) for some positive constant c and for 0 < ν < 1. A comparative model is also used by
[4] with a step-size sequence to be ǫi(k) = 1/(Vi(k)+Ri(α(k)), where Vi(k) is the accumulated beneﬁts
of agent i up to time k, which gives rise to an urn process introduced by [3]. Some similarities are also
shared with the Cross’ learning model of [2], where ǫ(k) = 1 and Ri(α(k)) ≤ 1, and its modiﬁcation
presented in [9], where ǫ(k), instead, is assumed decreasing. The aforementioned reinforcement
schemes do not have identical convergence properties with   LR−I. Their diﬀerences will be discussed
in detail throughout the paper.
73.2 Mean-Field Dynamics and Stationary Points
As will be discussed in detail in a forthcoming section, the asymptotic behavior of the reinforcement
learning scheme can be analyzed via the ODE method for stochastic approximations [24]. In par-
ticular, the asymptotic behavior of the discrete-time recursion (3) can be associated with the limit
points of the following ODE (or mean-ﬁeld dynamics):
˙ xi = ¯ gi(x), i ∈ I, (6)
where gi = col{gis}s∈Ai and
gis(x) =

Uis(x) −
 
q∈Ai
Uiq(x)xiq

xis. (7)
Among the potential limit points of the ODE (6) are its stationary points, which are deﬁned as
the set of points x ∈ ∆ for which gi(x) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
Before describing the stationary points of the mean-ﬁeld dynamics (6) under the reinforcement
learning scheme, it is important to point out that the corresponding mean-ﬁeld of the share of
strategy s in agent i coincides with the corresponding share provided by the standard replicator
dynamics (cf., [10, Chapter 7]), as pointed out by [2, Proposition 1]. This form of dynamics can also
be thought of as a special class of imitative dynamics, as discussed in [25, Section 5.4].
In several cases, the following more compact form of standard replicator dynamics will be more
convenient:
gi(x) = Xi(xi) · Ui(x), i ∈ I, (8)
where Xi : ∆(|Ai|) → R|Ai|×|Ai|, such that [Xi(xi)]jj = xij(1 − xij) for any j ∈ Ai and [Xi(xi)]jk =
−xijxik for any j,k ∈ Ai, with j  = k.
The following proposition and corollaries characterize the stationary points of the ODE (6) and
are well known results for replicator dynamics (see, e.g., Section 3.3.1 in [26]).
Proposition 3.1 (Stationary points) A strategy proﬁle x∗ is a stationary point of the ODE (6)
if and only if, for every agent i ∈ I, there exists a constant ci > 0, such that for any action j ∈ Ai,
x∗
ij > 0 implies Uij(x∗) = ci.
Two straightforward implications of Proposition 3.1 are:
Corollary 3.1 (Pure Strategies) Any pure strategy proﬁle is a stationary point of the ODE (6).
Corollary 3.2 (Nash Equilibria) Any Nash equilibrium is a stationary point of the ODE (6).
8Note that for some games not all stationary points of the ODE (6) are Nash equilibria. For
example, in the Typewriter Game of Table 1, the pure strategy proﬁles that correspond to (A,B) or
(B,A) are not Nash equilibria, although they are stationary points of (6).
A B
A 4,4 2,2
B 2,2 3,3
Table 1: The Typewriter Game.
On the other hand, any stationary point in the interior of the probability simplex will necessarily
be a Nash equilibrium as the following corollary states:
Corollary 3.3 (Mixed Nash equilibria) Any stationary point x∗ of the ODE (6) for λ = 0, such
that x∗ ∈ ∆o, is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium of the game.
Note that the above corollaries do not exclude the possibility that there exist stationary points
in ∂∆ without those necessarily being pure strategy proﬁles.
3.3 Convergence to saddle boundary points
Convergence to non-desirable stationary points, such as the ones which are not Nash equilibria,
cannot be excluded when agents employ the reinforcement scheme   LR−I.
Proposition 3.2 (Convergence to boundary points) Under the reinforcement scheme   LR−I,
the probability that the same action proﬁle will be played for all future times is uniformly bounded
away from zero over all initial conditions if Ri(α) > 1 for each α ∈ A and i ∈ I.
Proof. The proof is presented in detail in Appendix A. ￿
The above proposition states that, under certain conditions on the payoﬀ function, the probability
that   LR−I converges to any vertex of the probability simplex is positive. This observation (also shown
in [12, 4] for diﬀerent versions of reinforcement learning) is because “the probability of a path to a
vertex” depends directly on the payoﬀ function Ri(α). In particular, the payoﬀ function determines
the level of reinforcement of a played action, and therefore, it determines the rate with which the
state xi of each agent i approaches a vertex. If this rate of approaching a vertex is suﬃciently
large such that the probability of the corresponding path to the vertex does not approach zero, then
convergence to any vertex may occur independently of whether this vertex corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium or not.
9To state this observation formally, it is important to quantify the dependence of “the probability
of a path to a vertex” with the payoﬀ function. We start by observing that “the probability of a path
to a vertex” is positive if “the probability of playing the corresponding action for all times onwards”
is positive. Let the latter probability be denoted by χ(α) for some action proﬁle α. As explained in
detail in Appendix A, the following equivalence holds:
χ(α) > 0 ⇔
∞  
k=0
(1 − xiαi(k)) < ∞, ∀i ∈ I. (9)
In other words, “playing the same action proﬁle α for all future times” is possible if and only if
the sequence {1 − xiαi(k)} is summable, i.e., when it approaches zero fast enough. This observation
agrees with our intuition. In fact, the faster the strategy proﬁle approaches a vertex, the larger the
probability of such a path to occur.
The importance of relation (9) lies on the fact that conditions on the summability of the sequence
{1 − xiαi(k)} can be derived with respect to the payoﬀ function Ri(α), which is reasonable, since
the sequence approaches zero fast enough when the reinforcement Ri(α) is suﬃciently large. In
particular, note that the sequence {1−xiαi(k)} is summable if, for suﬃciently large k, the following
condition is satisﬁed:2
k
 
1 − xiαi(k)
1 − xiαi(k + 1)
− 1
 
≥
Ri(α)
1 +
1−Ri(α)
k
> 1.
This condition is always true, for suﬃciently large k, when Ri(α) > 1.
This observation reveals a characteristic feature of several reinforcement learning schemes, that
is convergence with positive probability to boundary points which are not Nash equilibrium proﬁles.
Fig. 1 shows a typical response of   LR−I in the Typewriter Game of Table 1. We observe that it is
possible for the process to converge to a pure strategy proﬁle which is not a Nash equilibrium when
Ri(α) > 1 for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I.
3.4 Prior work and discussion
This characteristic feature of reinforcement learning has also been mentioned in references [12, 4]. In
particular, in [12] the reinforcement model of [1] was considered. The only diﬀerence of the learning
model of [1] with   LR−I is the step-size sequence, which in case of [1] is deﬁned as ǫ(k) = 1/(ckν+Ri(α))
for some positive parameter c and for 0 < ν < 1. Reference [12] showed that convergence to pure
strategy proﬁles which are not Nash equilibria can be excluded as long as c > Ri(α) for all i ∈ I and
ν = 1. This statement agrees with Proposition 3.2, since in   LR−I we have c = 1.
2The condition follows from Raabe’s convergence criterion.
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Figure 1: Typical response of   LR−I on the Typewriter Game of Table 1 when ν = 1.
For the alternative reinforcement scheme of [3], which corresponds to an urn process, convergence
to a non-Nash action proﬁle can be excluded as shown in [4]. This scheme can be equivalently written
in the recursive form of   LR−I for which the step-size sequence will be ǫi(k) = 1/(Vi(k) + Ri(α)),
where Vi(k) is the accumulated beneﬁts of agent i up to time k. This model has been analyzed in [4],
where it was shown that the recursion converges with probability zero to any stationary point of the
replicator dynamics which is not a Nash equilibrium. However, as [4] points out and we also showed
in Proposition 3.2, similar statements cannot be derived for more general reinforcement learning
schemes.
Compared to this work, the main goal of this paper is to investigate the eﬀect of perturbations
on the convergence behavior of reinforcement learning, and more speciﬁcally, whether convergence to
non-Nash pure strategies still occurs with positive probability. Note that convergence analysis in the
vicinity of the boundary can be complicated (as also pointed out by [12]), since standard mean-ﬁeld
approaches do not apply. Thus, the perturbation schemes considered should not only be reasonable
and practically justiﬁable, but also need to be easily analyzable to allow for the derivation of clear
insights on their eﬀects.
114 Perturbed Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we introduce a class of perturbed reinforcement schemes, where an agent’s strategy is
slightly perturbed when its strategy is in the vicinity of a pure strategy, i.e., when the agent appears
more certain about which action to play.
4.1 Pertubed Reinforcement Learning Scheme (   Lλ
R−I)
Here we consider a perturbed version of   LR−I, in the same spirit with [15], where the decisions of
each agent are slightly perturbed. In particular, we assume that each agent i selects action j ∈ Ai
according to the perturbed strategy
σij , (1 − ζi(xi,λ))xij + ζi(xi,λ)/|Ai|, (10)
for some perturbation function ζi : ∆(|Ai|) × [0,1] → [0,1] (usually called mutations), which is
deﬁned as a function of the strategy (or state) of agent i.
The introduction of a state-dependent mutations function intends on exploring how local infor-
mation of each agent i, namely its strategy xi, can alter the convergence properties of the state of
the group. Here, we investigate one class of such mutations function. In particular, we would like
ζi(xi,λ) to exhibit larger values when the strategy xi is close to a vertex of the probability simplex,
i.e., the strategy is close to a pure-strategy proﬁle. Informally, players are experimenting more when
they are quite certain about which action to choose.
In principle, such perturbation scheme is not diﬀerent than one where experimentation occurs
with equal probability throughout the whole domain. However, for a strategy in the interior of the
domain xi, which puts positive probability to all available actions, a ﬁxed perturbation is not neces-
sary for exploring alternative strategies. Instead, it is only at strategies close to pure-strategy proﬁles
where experimentation seems necessary for exploring alternative strategies, since at a pure-strategy
proﬁle and under the unperturbed reinforcement learning, the probability of exploring diﬀerent action
proﬁles is zero.
The deﬁnition of such perturbation functions is open-ended. Here, we choose a function that
smoothly increases to its maximum located at pure-strategy proﬁles as Fig. 2 demonstrates. We
formally deﬁne this smoothness of the perturbation function as follows:
Assumption 2 (Perturbation function) The perturbation function ζi is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable. Furthermore, for some β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one, ζi satisﬁes the following properties:
1. ζi(xi,λ) = 0 for all xi such that |xi|∞ < β for any λ ≥ 0;
2. lim|xi|∞→1 ζi(xi,λ) = λ;
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Figure 2: Candidate perturbation function (11).
3. lim|xi|∞→1
∂ζi(xi,λ)
∂λ |(λ=0) = c for some c > 0;
4. lim|xi|∞→1
∂ζi(xi,λ)
∂xij |(λ=0) = 0 for any j ∈ Ai.
In other words, we would like the perturbation function of agent i (1) to be zero when its strategy
is not close to a vertex of ∆(|Ai|); and (2) to be equal to λ when its strategy is at a vertex of ∆(|Ai|).
Properties (3) and (4) are necessary in order to analyze the behavior of the stochastic process in the
vicinity of the vertices of ∆(|Ai|). In particular, property (3) states that the perturbation increases
with λ, when evaluated at a vertex of the probability simplex and for λ = 0. As we shall see in a
forthcoming section, due to this property, vertices cease to be stationary points of the mean-ﬁeld
dynamics introduced in Section 5, which has favorable implications on the asymptotic behavior of
the learning dynamics. Finally, property (4) states that the perturbation does not change with x
when evaluated at a vertex of the probability simplex and for λ = 0. Together with property (1),
property (4) establishes equivalence among perturbed and unperturbed dynamics when λ = 0.
For example, a candidate perturbation function is:
ζi(xi,λ) =



0 |xi|∞ < β,
λ
(1−β)2(|xi|∞ − β)2 |xi|∞ ≥ β.
(11)
It is straightforward to check that this function satisﬁes the properties of Assumption 2 when we
select β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one. Figure 2 plots the candidate perturbation function (11)
about one of the vertices of the domain ∆(|Ai|).
Note that the main diﬀerence with the previously introduced scheme in [15] is that here we allow
for the perturbation function of each agent to also depend on agent’s own strategy. Instead, in [15],
the perturbation function was assumed to be a constant λ > 0 for all agents i ∈ I and for all strategy
vectors in ∆(|Ai|).
We will denote this scheme by   Lλ
R−I.
134.2 Discussion
Similar ideas of state dependent mutations have been explored in aspiration learning [27] and in
adaptive learning [14]. In both references, the intention is to investigate how an equilibrium selection
scheme with state-dependent excitation of the dynamics may give rise to more desirable outcomes.
For example, in [27], the intention is to show that the aspiration learning scheme will converge to a
Pareto eﬃcient action proﬁle. In a similar spirit, reference [14] introduces globally state dependent
mutations to show that each action proﬁle can be a stochastically stable outcome of an evolutionary
learning process, when we tailor appropriately the mutations function.
In this work, we are not interested in analyzing the convergence properties of reinforcement
learning under general forms of state-dependent mutations functions. The intention instead is to
analyze a speciﬁc class of state-dependent perturbation which are reasonable within the context of
human-like behavior. In particular, we consider perturbation functions such that a) the perturbation
of each agent i depends only on the strategy xi of that agent (contrary to the more general schemes
in [14] where the dependence is on x), and b) the perturbation puts more weight on pure-strategy
proﬁles than mixed strategies. As discussed in the previous section, such schemes are reasonable
since they capture the tendency of experimentation when agents appear quite certain about the
actions to choose.
We wish to investigate whether such perturbation schemes may provide better insights on how
the convergence properties of reinforcement learning changes under small perturbations.
5 Background Convergence Analysis
Let Ω , ∆∞ denote the canonical path space with an element ω being a sequence {x(0),x(1),...},
where x(k) = (x1(k),...,xn(k)) ∈ ∆ is generated by the reinforcement learning process. An example
of a random variable deﬁned in Ω is the function ψk : Ω → ∆ such that ψk(ω) = x(k). Another
example of a random variable that we will also use is ψk(ω) = α(k). In several cases, we will abuse
notation by simply writing x(k) or α(k) instead of ψk(ω). Let also F be a σ-algebra of subsets in
Ω and P, E be the probability and expectation operator on (Ω,F), respectively. In the following
analysis, we implicitly assume that the σ-algebra F is generated appropriately to allow computation
of the probabilities or expectations of interest.
To analyze the asymptotic behavior of the reinforcement learning schemes, we will use a) stochas-
tic Lyapunov stability analysis, in order to investigate the probabilities that a sample function exits
from a domain, and b) the ODE method for stochastic approximations in order to investigate the
probability of convergence to invariant sets of the mean-ﬁeld dynamics. The background analysis
which is necessary for the analysis are presented in the following subsections.
145.1 Exit of a sample function from a domain
It is important to have conditions under which the process ψk(ω) = x(k), k ≥ 0, with some initial
distribution, will exit an open domain G in ﬁnite time.
Proposition 5.1 (Theorem 5.1 in [28]) Suppose that there exists a nonnegative function, V (k,x),
in the domain k ≥ 0, x ∈ G, such that
∆V (k,x) , E[V (k + 1,x(k + 1)) − V (k,x(k))|x(k) = x]
satisﬁes ∆V (k,x) ≤ −a(k) in this domain, where a(k) is a sequence such that
a(k) > 0,
∞  
k=0
a(k) = ∞. (12)
Then, the process x(k) leaves G in a ﬁnite time with probability 1.
The following corollary is important in cases we would like to consider entrance of a stochastic
process into the domain of attraction of an equilibrium. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.1.
For details, see Exercise 5.1 in [28].
Corollary 5.1 Let A ⊂ ∆, Bδ(A) its δ-neighborhood, and Dδ(A) , ∆\Bδ(A). Suppose there exists
a nonnegative function V (k,x) in the domain k ≥ 0, x ∈ ∆ for which
∆V (k,x) ≤ −a(k)ϕ(k,x), k ≥ 0,x ∈ ∆, (13)
where the sequence a(k) satisﬁes (12) and ϕ(k,x) satisﬁes
inf
k≥T,x∈Dδ(A)
ϕ(k,x) > 0
for all δ > 0 and some T = T(δ). Then
P
 
liminf
k→∞
dist(x(k),A) = 0
 
= 1.
Corollary 5.1 implies that the stochastic process enters an arbitrarily small neighborhood of a set
A inﬁnitely often with probability one.
155.2 Convergence to mean-ﬁeld dynamics
The convergence properties of   Lλ
R−I can be described via the ODE method for stochastic approxi-
mations. In particular, the recursion of   Lλ
R−I, λ ≥ 0, can be written in the following form:
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ǫ(k) · [gλ
i (x(k)) + ξλ
i (k)], (14)
where the observation sequence has been decomposed into a deterministic sequence, gλ
i (x(k)), (or
mean-ﬁeld) and a noise sequence ξλ
i (k). The mean-ﬁeld is deﬁned as follows:
gλ
i (x) , E
 
Ri(α(k))[eαi(k) − xi(k)]|x(k) = x
 
such that its s-th entry is
gλ
is(x) = Uis(x)σis −
 
q∈Ai
Uiq(x)σiqxis.
It is straightforward to verify that gλ
i (·) is continuously diﬀerentiable due to the deﬁnition of the
perturbation function ζi. The noise sequence is deﬁned as
ξλ
i (k) , Ri(α(k)) ·
 
eαi(k) − xi(k)
 
− gλ
i (x(k)),
where E[ξλ
i (k)|x(k) = x] = 0 for all x ∈ ∆.
Note that for λ = 0, (14) coincides with   LR−I. We will denote g(x) the corresponding vector
ﬁeld.
The following more compact form of (14) also will be used:
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ǫ(k) ·
 
gλ(x(k)) + ξλ(k)
 
, (15)
where gλ(·) , col{gλ
i (·)}i∈I and ξλ(·) , col{ξλ
i (·)}i∈I.
Proposition 5.2 (Convergence) For the reinforcement scheme   Lλ
R−I, λ ≥ 0, the stochastic iter-
ation (15) is such that, for almost all ω ∈ Ω, {ψk(ω) = x(k)} converges to some bounded invariant
set of the ODE:
˙ x = gλ(x). (16)
Furthermore, if A ⊂ ∆ is a locally asymptotically stable set in the sense of Lyapunov for (16),3 and
3If {x(t) : t ≥ 0} denotes the solution of the ODE (16), then a set A ⊂ ∆ is a locally asymptotically stable set in the
sense of Lyapunov for the ODE (16) if a) for each ε > 0, there exists δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that dist(x(0),A) < δ implies
dist(x(t),A) < ε for all t ≥ 0, and b) there exists δ > 0 such that dist(x(0),A) < δ implies limt→∞ dist(x(t),A) = 0.
16x(k) is in some compact set in the domain of attraction of A inﬁnitely often with probability ≥ ρ,
then x(k) → A with at least probability ρ.
Proof. The proposition follows from Theorem 6.6.1 of [29] since the following conditions are satisﬁed:
− The function gλ(·) is continuous.
− The sequence Y (k) , gλ(x(k)) + ξλ(k) satisﬁes supk E[|Y (k)|
2] < ∞ since, by Assumption 1,
the reward function is positive and bounded from above.
− The step size sequence satisﬁes
 
k ǫ(k)2 < ∞ and
 
k ǫ(k) = ∞.
￿
6 Stationary Points
In the following subsections, we characterize the set of stationary points for both the unperturbed
(λ = 0) and the perturbed dynamics (λ > 0).
We will make the following distinction among stationary points of (16) for λ > 0, denoted Sλ:
− Sλ
∂∆: stationary points in ∂∆;
− Sλ
∆∗: stationary points which are vertices of ∆;
− Sλ
∆o: stationary points in ∆o;
− Sλ
NE: stationary points which are Nash equilibria.
We will also use the notation S∂∆, S∆∗, S∆o, and SNE to denote the corresponding sets when
λ = 0.
For the remainder of the paper, we will only consider games which satisfy the following
property:
Assumption 3 For the unperturbed dynamics, there are no stationary points in ∂∆ other than the
ones in ∆∗, i.e., S∂∆\S∆∗ = ∅. Moreover, if S∆o  = ∅, there exists δ > 0 such that Bδ(S∆o) ⊂ ∆o.
In other words, we only consider games for which, the stationary points of (16) for λ = 0 in the
boundary of ∆ are vertices of ∆, and the stationary points in ∆o are isolated from the boundary.
Assumption 3 is not restrictive and is satisﬁed for most but trivial cases.
Note also that Assumption 3 does not exclude the possibility that the vector ﬁeld g(x) exhibits
invariant sets other than stationary points.
176.1 Stationary Points of Perturbed Dynamics (λ > 0)
A straightforward implication of the properties of the perturbation function is the following:
Lemma 6.1 (Sensitivity of S∆o) There exists β0 ∈ (0,1) such that S∆o ⊆ Sλ
∆o for any β0 < β < 1
and any λ > 0.
Proof. Due to Assumption 3, there exist β0 ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and δ > 0, such that,
for any β0 < β < 1, we have ζi(xi,λ) = 0 for all i ∈ I and x ∈ Bδ(S∆o). Thus, the conclusion
follows. ￿
Vertices of ∆ cease to be equilibria for λ > 0. The following lemma provides the sensitivity of
S∆∗ to small values of λ.
Lemma 6.2 (Sensitivity of S∆∗) For any stationary point x∗ ∈ S∆∗, which corresponds to a strict
Nash equilibrium and for suﬃciently small λ > 0, there exists a unique continuously diﬀerentiable
function ν∗ : R+ → R|A|, such that limλ↓0 ν∗(λ) = ν∗(0) = 0, and
˜ x = x∗ + ν∗(λ) ∈ ∆o (17)
is a stationary point of the ODE (16). If instead x∗ ∈ S∆∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then for any
suﬃciently small δ > 0 and λ > 0, the δ-neighborhood of x∗ in ∆, Bδ(x∗), does not contain any
stationary point of the ODE (16).
Proof. The proof follows similar reasoning with the Proof of Proposition 3.5 in [15]. In the Ap-
pendix B, we present the main steps of the proof. ￿
Note that the statements of Lemma 6.2 do not depend on the selection of β. Instead, they
require λ to be suﬃciently small. Also, note that Lemma 6.2 does not discuss the sensitivity of
Nash equilibria which are not strict. However, it is straightforward to show that vertices cannot be
stationary points for λ > 0.
Let also   Sλ
NE denote the set of stationary points in ∆o which are perturbations of the stationary
points in S∆∗ ∩ SNE (strict or non-strict) for some λ > 0.
Proposition 6.1 (Stationary points of perturbed dynamics) For any β ∈ (0,1), let δ∗ =
δ∗(β) be the smallest δ > 0 such that, for all x ∈ ∆\Bδ(∆∗), ζi(xi,λ) = 0 for some i ∈ I. When β
is suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 is suﬃciently small, then:
(a)   Sλ
NE ⊂ Bδ∗(∆∗);
18(b) Sλ = S∆o ∪   Sλ
NE.
In other words, the stationary points of the perturbed dynamics are either the interior stationary
points of the unperturbed dynamics or perturbations of pure Nash equilibria. Proposition 6.1 is
an immediate implication of Lemmas 6.1–6.2 and Assumption 3. Proof. Pick β > β0, where β0
is deﬁned in Lemma 6.1. Then S∆o ⊆ Sλ
∆o ≡ Sλ. The rest of the stationary points are pertur-
bations of the vertices characterized by Lemma 6.2. Due to the deﬁnition of δ∗ = δ∗(β), we have
  Sλ
NE ⊂ Bδ∗(∆∗), since outside Bδ∗(∆∗) the dynamics coincide with the unperturbed dynamics for at
least one agent. When we further take β to be suﬃciently close to one (which implies that δ∗ = δ∗(β)
approaches zero) and λ suﬃciently small, then, according to Lemma 6.2,   Sλ
NE are the only stationary
points in Bδ∗(∆∗), and therefore Sλ = S∆o ∪   Sλ
NE. ￿
Note that due to the introduction of the state-dependent perturbation function in the decision
rule of the players, vertices of ∆ cease to be stationary points of the ODE (16) when λ > 0. Due to
this property, the introduction of the state-dependent perturbation function addresses the issue of
justifying nonconvergence to boundary points which are not Nash equilibria, as discussed in detail
in Section 3.3. This property of perturbed reinforcement learning will be analyzed in detail in the
forthcoming Section 7.
6.2 Demonstration
To demonstrate the sensitivity of the stationary points to the perturbation function, we plot the
vector ﬁeld of the ODE (16) in the vicinity of ∆∗, i.e., the vertices of the domain ∆. For demon-
stration purposes, we assume that there are two agents whose utility function is deﬁned by Table 1,
i.e., there are two pure Nash equilibria corresponding to action proﬁles (A,A) and (B,B).
Fig. 3 plots the vector ﬁeld of the ODE (16) in the vicinity of a non-Nash pure strategy proﬁle,
speciﬁcally in the vicinity of (B,A) which corresponds to strategies 1 − x∗
11 = x∗
21 = 1. We observe
that this is a stationary point of the ODE (16) for λ = 0, while it is no longer a stationary point
when λ = 0.01. This conclusion agrees with the second statement of Lemma 6.2 which states that
for suﬃciently small neighborhood Bδ(x∗) of a non-Nash action proﬁle x∗, and for suﬃciently small
λ > 0, Bδ(x∗) does not contain any stationary point of the ODE (16).
On the other hand, Fig. 4 plots the vector ﬁeld of the ODE (16) in the vicinity of (B,B)
which corresponds to strategies x∗
11 = x∗
21 = 0. As expected, when λ = 0, this strategy allocation
corresponds to a stationary point of the ODE as shown in Fig. 4(a). When, instead, λ = 0.01 in
Fig. 4(b), observe the slight displacement of the original stationary point towards the interior of the
probability simplex as predicted by the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 6.2.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of a non-Nash stationary point to λ: (a) λ = 0, (b) λ = 0.01 and β = 0.9.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of a strict Nash stationary point to λ: (a) λ = 0, (b) λ = 0.01 and β = 0.9.
7 Convergence of Perturbed Dynamics (   Lλ
R−I)
The convergence analysis of the perturbed dynamics   Lλ
R−I will be subject to the following assumption:
Assumption 4 For the unperturbed dynamics,   LR−I, there exists a twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and nonnegative function V : ∆ → R+ such that
(a) ∇xV (x)Tg(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ∆;
(b) ∇xV (x)Tg(x) = 0 if and only if g(x) = 0.
20In the forthcoming Section 8, we will discuss classes of games that satisfy these conditions under
  LR−I.
For some δ > 0, consider the δ-neighborhood of the set of stationary points Sλ, Bδ(Sλ). Deﬁne
also the closed set: Dδ(Sλ) , ∆\Bδ(Sλ).
Lemma 7.1 Under Assumption 4, for β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 suﬃciently
small, there exists δ = δ(β,λ) > 0 such that
sup
x∈Dδ(Sλ)
∇xV (x)Tgλ(x) < 0.
Proof. Pick δ∗ = δ∗(β) according to Proposition 6.1, such that, for all x ∈ ∆\Bδ∗(∆∗), ζi(xi,λ) = 0
for at least one agent i. Then, according to Proposition 6.1, when we take β suﬃciently close to one
(which implies that δ∗ approaches zero) and λ suﬃciently small, then (a)   Sλ
NE ⊂ Bδ∗(∆∗), and (b)
Sλ = S∆o ∪   Sλ
NE. Due to Assumption 4, there exists δ = δ(β,λ) > δ∗ such that Bδ∗(∆∗) ⊂ Bδ(Sλ)
and
sup
x∈Dδ(Sλ)
∇xV (x)Tgλ(x) < 0.
Thus, the conclusion follows. ￿
Lemma 7.2 (LAS -   Lλ
R−I) For any λ > 0 suﬃciently small, any stationary point ˜ x ∈   Sλ
NE, which
is a perturbation of a strict Nash equilibrium according to (17), is a locally asymptotically stable point
of the ODE (16).
Proof. The proof follows similar reasoning with the proof of Proposition 3.6 in [15]. ￿
Theorem 7.1 (Convergence to Nash equilibria) Under Assumption 4, if agents employ the
perturbed reinforcement scheme   Lλ
R−I for some β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 suﬃ-
ciently small, then there exists δ = δ(β,λ) such that,
P
 
liminf
k→∞
dist(x(k),Bδ(Sλ)) = 0
 
= 1.
Also, for almost all ω, the process {ψk(ω) = x(k)} converges to some invariant set in Bδ(Sλ).
Proof. Consider the nonnegative function V (x) of Assumption 4. We can approximate the expected
incremental gain of V (x) by applying a Taylor series expansion as follows:
∆V (k,x) = ∇xV (x)TE[x(k + 1) − x(k)|x(k) = x] + O(ǫ(k)2),
21where O(ǫ(k)2) denotes terms of order ǫ(k)2. Note that such an expansion is possible due to the fact
that the second-order derivatives of V (·) are continuous in ∆. Equivalently,
∆V (k,x) = ǫ(k)∇xV (x)Tgλ(x) + O(ǫ(k)2). (18)
Due to Lemma 7.1, there exists δ = δ(β,λ) > 0 such that
−¯ ρ , sup
x∈Dδ(Sλ)
∇xV (x)Tgλ(x) < 0.
Thus,
∆V (k,x) ≤ −ǫ(k)¯ ρ + O(ǫ(k)2),
uniformly in x ∈ Dδ(Sλ). The right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly negative and can be
formulated in the form of condition (13). Therefore, the conditions of Corollary 5.1 are satisﬁed and
P
 
liminf
k→∞
dist(x(k),Bδ(Sλ)) = 0
 
= 1.
From Proposition 5.2, we also have that the process {ψk(ω) = x(k)} will converge to some in-
variant set of the ODE in Bδ(Sλ) almost surely. ￿
Theorem 7.1 is an immediate implication of Assumptions 3–4 and Lemma 7.1 and shows that
the perturbed reinforcement scheme   Lλ
R−I converges almost surely to some invariant set within an
arbitrarily small neighborhood of the stationary points Sλ of the perturbed dynamics.
Recall also that, according to Proposition 6.1, the set Sλ includes a) the stationary points in
∆o which are perturbations of S∆∗ ∩ SNE (i.e., stationary points which correspond to strict and
non-strict pure Nash equilibria), and b) interior stationary points of the unperturbed dynamics, S∆o
(e.g., mixed Nash equilibria). Although Theorem 7.1 does not explicitly characterize the invariant
sets within Bδ(Sλ) to which convergence is attained, δ = δ(β,λ) can become arbitrarily small by
appropriately selecting β and λ.
If we further exclude convergence to S∆o (which is possible for some classes of games as we shall
see in the forthcoming Section 8), then Theorem 7.1 will imply convergence to an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of   Sλ
NE. In this case, given that the stationary points in   Sλ
NE can become arbitrarily
close to the corresponding vertices of the simplex (due to Proposition 6.1(a)), Theorem 7.1 implicitly
implies convergence to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the corresponding vertices of the simplex
(i.e., the ones corresponding to λ-perturbations of Nash equilibria of the game). We will discuss this
observation in greater detail in the forthcoming Section 8.
228 Specialization to Potential Games
8.1 Potential games
In this section, we will specialize the convergence analysis of Section 7 to a class of games which
belongs to the general family of ordinal potential games (cf., [16]). In particular, we will consider
games which satisfy the following property:
Property 8.1 There exists a C2 function f : ∆ → R such that
∇σif(σ) = Ui(σ)
for all σ ∈ ∆ and i ∈ I.
This property has been used to deﬁne potential games in population games [30], where players
from an inﬁnite-size population are paired to play the game, and σ corresponds to the average
strategy in the population. The model here is equivalent, since instead of an inﬁnite-size population
of players and ﬁnite strategies, we consider a ﬁnite number of players with a continuum of strategies.
A straightforward calculation can show that the function f serves as a potential function under the
deﬁnition of [16], since for every i ∈ I and σi,σ′
i ∈ ∆(|Ai|), we have
f(σ′
i,σ−i) − f(σi,σ−i) = ∇σif(σ)T(σ′
i − σi)
= Ui(σ)T(σ′
i − σi)
= ui(σ′
i,σ−i) − ui(σi,σ−i)
where the ﬁrst equality results from the Taylor series expansion of f about σ = (σi,σ−i) ∈ ∆ and
the fact that ∇2
σif(σ) = 0.
Example 1: (Common-payoﬀ games) One class of games which satisﬁes Property 8.1 is common-
payoﬀ or identical-interest games, where the payoﬀ function is the same for all players. In other
words, there exists a function d : A → R+ such that the expected payoﬀ of player i ∈ I at strategy
proﬁle σ is:
ui(σ) =
 
α∈A
d(α)
 
k∈I
σkαk.
Deﬁne f(σ) , ui(σ) for some i ∈ I. Then, it is straightforward to check that
∂f(σ)
∂σij
=
 
{α:αi=j}
d(α)
 
k∈−i
σkαk = Uij(σ),
23i.e., f satisﬁes Property 8.1. An example of a common-payoﬀ game is the Typewriter Game of
Table 1.
Example 2: (Congestion games) A typical congestion game consists of a set I of n players and a
set P of m paths. For each player i, let the set of pure strategies Ai be the set of m paths. The cost
to each player i of selecting the path p depends on the number of players that are using the same
path. The expected number of players using path p is
χp(σ) ,
 
i∈I
σip.
Deﬁne cp = cp(χp) to be the cost of using path p when χp players are using path p and let cp(χp) be
linear on χp. The expected utility of player i is deﬁned as:
ui(σ) , −
 
p∈P
cp(χp(σ)).
Note that the function
f(σ) , −
 
p∈P
  χp(σ)
0
cp(z)dz
satisﬁes Property 8.1.
8.2 Convergence to Nash equilibria
The following proposition establishes convergence to Nash equilibria for this class of potential games.
Proposition 8.1 (Convergence to Nash equilibria) For the class of games satisfying Property 8.1,
the perturbed reinforcement scheme   Lλ
R−I satisﬁes the conclusions of Theorem 7.1.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the conditions of Assumption 4 are satisﬁed for the unperturbed
dynamics. In particular, deﬁne the nonnegative function
V (x) , fmax − f(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ ∆, (19)
where fmax , supx∈∆ f(x). Note that ∇xiV (x) = −Ui(x), and
Ui(x)Tgi(x) = Ui(x)TXi(xi)Ui(x)
=
|Ai|  
s=1
|Ai|  
j=1,j>s
xisxij(Uis(x) − Uij(x))2
≥ 0.
24Thus,
∇xV (x)Tg(x) = −U(x)Tg(x) = −
 
i∈I
Ui(x)TXi(xi)Ui(x) ≤ 0
for all x ∈ ∆.
We also observe that ∇xV (x)Tg(x) = 0 if and only if Uis(x) = Uij(x) for any i ∈ I and any
s,j ∈ Ai, s  = j such that xis,xij > 0. By Proposition 3.1, these points correspond to the stationary
points of g(x). Therefore, the conditions of Assumption 4 are also satisﬁed. Thus, the conclusions
of Theorem 7.1 hold for the class of games satisfying Property 8.1. ￿
8.3 Convergence to pure Nash equilibria
In several games, convergence to mixed Nash equilibria of the unperturbed dynamics S∆o can be
excluded. In this case, convergence of the perturbed dynamics to stationary points in   Sλ
NE which are
perturbations of pure Nash equilibria can be established.
Let x−i denote the distribution over action proﬁles of the group of agents −i. Let Di be the
matrix of payoﬀs of agents i and D−i be the matrix of payoﬀs of −i. The vector of expected payoﬀs
of agent i and −i can be expressed as Ui(x) = Dix−i and U−i(x) = D−ixi, respectively.
To analyze the behavior around stationary points in ∆o, we consider the nonnegative function
V (x) , fmax − f(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ ∆, where fmax , supx∈∆ f(x). It is straightforward to verify that the
Jacobian matrix of f(x) is:
∇2
xf(x) =
  O Di
D−i O
 
.
Higher-order derivatives of f(x) will be zero, therefore from the extension of Taylor’s Theorem
(cf., Theorem 5.15 in [31]) to multivariable functions, we have:
∆V (k,x) = −∇xf(x)TE[δx(k)|x(k) = x]−
E[δx−i(k)TD−iδxi(k)|x(k) = x]−
E[δxi(k)TDiδx−i(k)|x(k) = x], (20)
where δx(k) , x(k + 1) − x(k).
A direct consequence of the above formulation and Proposition 5.1 is the following:
Proposition 8.2 (Nonconvergence to S∆o) If agents employ the unperturbed reinforcement scheme
  LR−I and x∗ ∈ S∆o satisﬁes
1. E[δx−i(k)TD−iδxi(k)|x(k) = x] > 0,
252. E[δxi(k)TDiδx−i(k)|x(k) = x] > 0
uniformly in x ∈ Bδ(x∗), for some δ > 0 suﬃciently small, then
P
 
lim
k→∞
x(k) = x∗
 
= 0.
Proof. We consider the nonnegative function V (x) deﬁned above. Note that the expected incre-
mental gain of V (x) (20), under the unperturbed dynamics, can take the following form:
V (k,x) = −ǫ(k)φ(k,x)
where infx∈Bδ(x∗) φ(k,x) > 0 for some δ > 0 suﬃciently small and for all k. This is due to the fact
that for any x ∈ Bδ(x∗),
−∇xf(x)TE[δx(k)|x(k) = x] ≤ 0
(due to Proposition 8.1), and the second-order terms of the incremental gain are strictly negative by
assumption. Then, from Proposition 5.1, we conclude that the unperturbed process will exit Bδ(x∗)
in ﬁnite time with probability one. Therefore, the conclusion follows. ￿
For several games testing the conditions of Proposition 8.2 may be hard. However, for two-player
two-action games, it is straightforward to show that:
E[δxi
TDiδx−i|xi(k) = xi,x−i(k) = x−i] =
ǫ(k)2xi1xi2x(−i)1x(−i)2(di
11 − di
12 − di
21 + di
22)·
((di
11)2 − (di
12)2 − (di
21)2 + (di
22)2), (21)
where di
sℓ denotes the (s,ℓ) entry of Di, i = 1,2. Consider, for example, the Typewriter Game of
Table 1. Since the game is symmetric, and di
11 > di
12, di
22 > di
21, i = 1,2, the second-order terms of
the incremental gain will be positive. The above computation can be extended in a similar manner
to the case of larger number of actions.
Proposition 8.3 (Convergence to pure Nash equilibria) In the framework of Proposition 8.1,
let the conditions of Proposition 8.2 also hold. If the game admits pure Nash equilibria which are all
strict, then, for some β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 suﬃciently small, the perturbed
process {ψk(ω) = x(k)} converges to the set   Sλ
NE for almost all ω, i.e.,
P
 
lim
k→∞
x(k) ∈   Sλ
NE
 
= 1.
26Proof. Since the game exhibits pure Nash equilibria which are all strict, the set   Sλ
NE in non-empty
for any λ > 0 suﬃciently small.
Let x∗ denote an action proﬁle which is a strict pure Nash equilibrium, i.e., for every i ∈ I there
exists j∗ = j∗(i) such that xij∗ = 1 and Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗) < 0 for any s  = j∗. Let also ˜ x ∈   Sλ
NE be
the perturbed stationary point according to (17). Pick also δ∗ = δ∗(β) > 0 similarly to the proof of
Lemma 7.1. Then, for any x ∈ Bδ∗(˜ x), xis is of order of δ∗ and
gλ
is(x) ≈ [Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗)]xis (22)
plus higher order terms of δ∗ and λ, for all s  = j∗. Since Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗) < 0 for all s  = j∗, we
conclude that the vector ﬁeld points towards the interior of Bδ∗(˜ x) when evaluated at the boundary
of Bδ∗(˜ x). Thus, Bδ∗(˜ x) is an invariant set of the ODE (16). Therefore, due to Proposition 8.2 and
Theorem 7.1, if we take β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 suﬃciently small, then there
exists δ = δ(β,λ) > δ∗ such that the process {x(k)} converges almost surely to some invariant set in
Bδ(   Sλ
NE).
Furthermore, due to Lemma 7.2, we know that the points in   Sλ
NE are locally asymptotically sta-
ble, and therefore by (22), the set Bδ(  Sλ
NE) belongs to its region of attraction. Since the perturbed
process visits Bδ(  Sλ
NE) inﬁnitely often, by Proposition 5.2, we conclude that the process converges to
  Sλ
NE with probability one. ￿
Proposition 8.3 specializes the conclusions of Theorem 7.1 to the case where i) Property 8.1 is
satisﬁed, ii) the pure Nash equilibria of the game are all strict, and iii) the hypotheses of Propo-
sition 8.2 also hold (i.e., convergence to mixed Nash equilibria can be excluded). Proposition 8.3
shows that asymptotic convergence to the set of stationary points   Sλ
NE (i.e., λ-perturbations of pure
Nash equilibria) can be achieved almost surely.
In case the game exhibits pure Nash equilibria which are not strict, the conclusions of Propo-
sition 8.3 might not hold. However, Theorem 7.1 still applies. In particular, under the hypotheses
of Proposition 8.2, Theorem 7.1 implies that the perturbed process will converge almost surely to
an invariant set within an arbitrarily small neighborhood of   Sλ
NE (i.e., λ-perturbations of pure Nash
equilibria). Furthermore, due to Proposition 6.1, the stationary points   Sλ
NE can become arbitrarily
close to the corresponding vertices of the simplex by appropriately selecting parameters β and λ.
We conclude that, even if the game exhibits pure Nash equilibria which are not strict, Theorem 7.1
implies that the perturbed process converges almost surely to an invariant set within an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of the vertices corresponding to   Sλ
NE.
278.4 Extension to Two-Player Rescaled Partnership Games
In two-player games, the convergence results of Propositions 8.1–8.3 can be extended to two-player
rescaled partnership games, introduced by [10] and deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 8.1 (Two-Player Rescaled Partnership Games) A two-player game with payoﬀ ma-
trices Di, i ∈ {1,2}, is a rescaled partnership game if there exist positive numbers ai, i ∈ {1,2}, and
matrices
Ci =
  ci1 ci2
ci1 ci2
 
∈ R2×2, i ∈ I,
such that the two-player game with payoﬀ matrices
D′
i , aiDi + Ci, i ∈ {1,2},
deﬁne a partnership game, i.e., D′
i =
 
D′
−i
 T.
Note that two-player partnership games are also potential games with potential function f : ∆ →
R such that
f(σ) , σT
i D′
iσ−i, (23)
for some i ∈ {1,2}.
As already pointed out by [4], two-player rescaled partnership games exhibit a nice property in
connection with standard replicator dynamics, summarized in the following claim.
Claim 8.1 For any two-player rescaled partnership game and for any x ∈ ∆, the following holds:
Xi(xi)D′
ix−i = aiXi(xi)Dix−i, i ∈ {1,2}. (24)
Due to this property, convergence to Nash equilibria in rescaled partnership games can be established
under the perturbed reinforcement scheme   Lλ
R−I.
Proposition 8.4 (Convergence in Rescaled Partnership Games) In the class of two-player
rescaled partnership games, the   Lλ
R−I reinforcement scheme satisﬁes the conclusions of Theorem 7.1.
Furthermore, if the conditions of Proposition 8.2 hold and the game admits pure Nash equilibria
which are all strict, then, for some β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one and λ > 0 suﬃciently small,
the process {ψk(ω) = x(k)} converges to the set   Sλ
NE for almost all ω, i.e.,
P
 
lim
k→∞
x(k) ∈   Sλ
NE
 
= 1.
28Proof. It suﬃces to show that the conditions of Assumption 4 are satisﬁed. In particular, deﬁne
the nonnegative function
V (x) , fmax − f(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ ∆,
where f is deﬁned according to (23) and fmax , supx∈∆ f(x). Note that ∇xiV (x) = −D′
ix−i, and
∇xV (x)T¯ g(x) = −
 
i∈I
xT
−i(D′
i)T¯ gi(x)
= −
 
i∈I
xT
−i(D′
i)TXi(xi)Dix−i
= −
 
i∈I
aixT
−iDT
i Xi(xi)Dix−i
≤ 0
for all x ∈ ∆, where the last equality is due to property (24) and the last inequality is due to
the fact that Xi(xi) is a positive semideﬁnite (symmetric) matrix (as was shown in the proof of
Proposition 8.1 and has pointed out in Exercise 9.6.3 of [10]).
Also, due to (24), we have that the stationary points of the mean-ﬁeld dynamics in a rescaled
partnership game with payoﬀ matrices Di, i ∈ I, coincide with the stationary points of the mean-ﬁeld
dynamics of the partnership game D′
i = aiDi + Ci, i ∈ I. We also observe that
∇xV (x)T¯ g(x) = 0 ⇔ aixT
−iDT
i Xi(xi)Dix−i = 0, ∀i ∈ I
which, according to the proof of Proposition 8.1, is satisﬁed if and only if x ∈ ∆ is a stationary point
of ¯ g(x).
Thus, the conditions of Assumption 4 are satisﬁed for the two-player rescaled partnership games
and therefore the conclusions of Theorem 7.1 hold. Furthermore, if the conditions of Proposition 8.2
apply and the game admits pure Nash equilibria which are all strict, then the conclusions of Propo-
sition 8.3 also hold. ￿
An analogous result to Proposition 8.4 has been shown by [4] for rescaled partnership games
under the reinforcement learning scheme of [3]. Proposition 8.4 can be thought of as an extension to
a larger class of reinforcement learning schemes (beyond the urn process of [3]), due to the freedom
in the selection of the step-size sequence (4). In fact, analogous results under a perturbed decision
rule of the form (10) can be derived in a straightforward manner for other forms of reinforcement
learning schemes, e.g., the reinforcement scheme of [1].
299 Conclusions
This paper presented a novel (perturbed) reinforcement learning scheme and analyzed convergence to
pure Nash equilibria. The main diﬀerence from prior schemes lies in the introduction of a perturbation
function in the decision rule of each agent which depends only on its own strategy. The introduction
of such perturbation function sidestepped issues regarding the behavior of the algorithm close to the
vertices of the simplex. In particular, we derived conditions under which the perturbed reinforcement
learning scheme converges to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria almost
surely. This constitutes our main contribution, since prior convergence analysis on reinforcement
learning has primarily focused on urn processes. We further specialized the results to a class of
games which belongs to the family of potential games. We ﬁnally extended the convergence results
to two-player rescaled partnership games, where we derived conditions under which convergence to
perturbations of strict pure Nash equilibria can be achieved.
A Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let us assume that action proﬁle α = (α1,α2,...αn) ∈ A has been selected at time k = 0. This
implies that xiαi(0) > 0, since actions are selected according to the strategy distribution σi(0) =
xi(0). The corresponding payoﬀ proﬁle will be R(α) = (R1(α),R2(α),...,Rn(α)), where according to
Assumption 1, Ri(α) > 0 for all i ∈ I. Let us deﬁne the following event:
Aτ , {ω ∈ Ω : ψk(ω) = α(k) = α for all k ≤ τ}.
Thus, Aτ corresponds to the case where the same action proﬁle has been performed for all times
k ≤ τ. Note that the sequence of events {Aτ} is decreasing, since Aτ ⊇ Aτ+1 for all τ = 1,2,....
Deﬁne also the event
A∞ ,
∞  
τ=1
Aτ ≡ {α(τ) = α,∀τ}.
Therefore, from continuity from above, we have:
P[A∞] = lim
τ→∞
P[Aτ] = lim
τ→∞
τ  
k=1
 
i∈I
xiαi(k) , χ(α).
The above upper bound χ(α) is non-zero if and only if
∞  
k=1
log(xiαi(k)) > −∞ for each i ∈ I. (25)
30Let us deﬁne the new variable
yi(k) , 1 − xiαi(k) =
 
j∈Ai\αi
xij(k),
which corresponds to the probability of agent i selecting any action other than αi. Equivalently,
condition (25) is equivalent to
−
∞  
k=0
log(1 − yi(k)) < ∞, for each i ∈ I. (26)
We also have that
lim
k→∞
−log(1 − yi(k))
yi(k)
= lim
k→∞
1
1 − yi(k)
> ρ
for some ﬁnite ρ > 0, since 0 ≤ yi(k) ≤ 1. Thus, from the limit comparison test, we conclude that
condition (26) holds, if and only if
∞  
k=1
yi(k) < ∞, for each i ∈ I.
Since ǫ(k) = 1/(kν + 1), for 1/2 < ν ≤ 1, we have:
yi(k + 1)
yi(k)
= 1 −
Ri(α)
kν + 1
≤ 1 −
Ri(α)
k + 1
.
By Raabe’s criterion, the series
 ∞
k=0 yi(k) is convergent if
lim
k→∞
k
 
yi(k)
yi(k + 1)
− 1
 
> 1.
Since
k
 
yi(k)
yi(k + 1)
− 1
 
≥ k
 
1
1 −
Ri(α)
k+1
− 1
 
= k
Ri(α)
k + 1 − Ri(α)
=
Ri(α)
1 +
1−Ri(α)
k
we conclude that the series
 ∞
k=0 yi(k) is convergent if Ri(α) > 1 for each i ∈ I. In other words, the
action proﬁle α will be performed for all future times with positive probability if Ri(α) > 1 for all
i ∈ I. Furthermore, if Ri(α) > 1 for all i ∈ I and for all α ∈ A, then the probability that the same
action proﬁle will be played for all future times is uniformly bounded away from zero over all initial
conditions.
31B Proof of Proposition 6.2
For any agent i ∈ I and any action s ∈ Ai, the corresponding entry of the vector ﬁeld is
gis(˜ x) = Uis(˜ x)[(1 − ζi)˜ xis + ζi/|Ai|] −
 
q∈Ai
Uiq(˜ x)[(1 − ζi)˜ xiq + ζi/|Ai|]˜ xis, (27)
where ζi = ζi(˜ xi,λ).
Consider any pure strategy proﬁle x∗, and take ˜ x = x∗+ν, for some ν = (ν1,ν2,...,νn) ∈ ×i∈IR|Ai|
such that νi ∈ null{1T} and ˜ xi = x∗
i + νi ∈ ∆(|Ai|) for all i ∈ I. Substituting ˜ x into (27), yields
gis(ν,λ) = Uis(˜ x)[(1 − ζi(x∗
is + νis) + ζi/|Ai|]
−
 
q∈Ai
Uiq(˜ x)
 
(1 − ζi)(x∗
iq + νiq) + ζi/|Ai|
 
(x∗
is + νis).
where ζi = ζi(x∗
i + νi,λ). The perturbation function has the following properties:
∂ζi(νi,λ)
∂νij
 
   
 
(0,0)
= 0, for all j ∈ Ai.
Furthermore, gis(0,0) = 0, since x∗ is a stationary point of the unperturbed dynamics. Thus, the
partial derivatives of gis evaluated at (0,0) are:
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νis
 
 
   
(0,0)
= Uis(x∗)(1 − x∗
is) −
 
q∈Ai
Uiq(x∗)x∗
iq,
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νiq
   
   
(0,0)
= −Uiq(x∗)x∗
is, for all q ∈ Ai\s.
Note also that for any ℓ ∈ I\i and m ∈ Aℓ, we have
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
=
∂Uis(˜ x)
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
x∗
is −
 
q∈Ai
∂Uiq(˜ x)
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
x∗
iqx∗
is.
Since x∗ corresponds to a pure strategy state, for each i ∈ I there exists j∗ = j∗(i) such that
x∗
i = ej∗, i.e., xij∗ = 1 and x∗
is = 0 for all s  = j∗. For this pure strategy state and for any s ∈ Ai\j∗
we have
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νis
   
 
 
(0,0)
= Uis(x∗) − Uij(x∗),
32and
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νiq
   
   
(0,0)
= 0 ∀q ∈ Ai\s,
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νℓm
   
   
(0,0)
= 0 ∀ℓ ∈ I\i,m ∈ Aℓ.
Given that νi ∈ null{1T} and ∂gis(ν,λ)/∂νij∗ = 0 for all s  = j∗, the behavior of g(·,·) with
respect to ν about the point (0,0) is described by the following Jacobian matrix:
∇νg(ν,λ)|(0,0) =


diag{U1s(x∗) − U1j∗(x∗)}s =j∗ 0
...
0 diag{Uns(x∗) − Unj∗(x∗)}s =j∗

.
The above Jacobian matrix has full rank if for each i ∈ I
Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗)  = 0 for all s  = j∗.
In this case, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a neighborhood D of λ = 0 and a unique
diﬀerentiable function ν∗ : D → R|A| such that ν∗(0) = 0 and g(ν∗(λ),λ) = 0, for any λ ∈ D.
To characterize exactly the stationary points for small values of λ, we need to also compute the
gradient of the mean-ﬁeld with respect to the perturbation parameter λ. Note that:
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂λ
   
   
(0,0)
=
Uis(˜ x)
|Ai|
∂ζi
∂λ
   
   
(0,0)
=
Uis(˜ x)
|Ai|
,
since the partial derivative of ζi with respect to λ when evaluated at (0,0) is 1.
Thus,
∇λg(ν,λ)|(0,0) =


col{U1s(x∗)/|A1|}s =j∗
. . .
col{Uns(x∗)/|An|}s =j∗

.
Again, by implicit function theorem, we have that
∇λν∗(λ)|λ=0 = −(∇νg(ν,λ)|(0,0))−1 · ∇λg(ν,λ)|(0,0)
which implies that for any i ∈ I and for any s  = j∗
dν∗
is(λ)
dλ
 
   
 
λ=0
= −
1
(Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗))
.
Since ν∗
is(0) = 0 and x∗
is = 0, in order for the solution ˜ x = x∗ + ν∗(λ) to be in ∆o, we also need the
condition dν∗
is(λ)/dλ|λ=0 > 0 to be satisﬁed for all s  = j∗. Since Uis(x∗) > 0 by Assumption 1, this
33condition is equivalent to
Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗) < 0
for all i ∈ I and any s  = j∗. This is also equivalent to x∗ being a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, the
conclusion follows.
If x∗ corresponds to an action proﬁle which is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exist i ∈ I and
s  = j∗ such that Uis(x∗) − Uij∗(x∗) > 0. For any β ∈ (0,1) which is suﬃciently close to one, there
exist δ0 = δ0(β) such that ζi(xi,λ) ≡ 0, i ∈ I, for any x ∈ ∆\Bδ(x∗), λ > 0 and δ ≥ δ0. For any
x ∈ Bδ(x∗), δ ≥ δ0, the vector ﬁeld becomes
gλ
is(x) ≈ [Uis(x) − Uij∗(x)]xis + Uis(x)ζi(xi,λ)/|Ai| (28)
plus higher order terms of λ and δ, for all s  = j∗. Since the Nash condition is violated in the
direction of s, Uis(x) − Uij∗(x) = c + O(δ), for some c > 0, where O(δ) denotes a quantity of order
of δ. Furthermore, by Assumption 1 of strictly positive rewards, Uis(x) > 0 for all s ∈ Ai and
x ∈ Bδ(x∗). Therefore, for any δ ≥ δ0 and for suﬃciently small λ > 0, the vector ﬁeld gis(x) > 0 for
any x ∈ Bδ(x∗), which implies that there is no stationary point of the vector ﬁeld in Bδ(x∗).
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